# Who Watches the Watchmen? Local News and Police Behavior in the United States

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Do U.S. municipal police departments respond to news coverage of local crime? We address this question exploiting an exogenous shock to local crime reporting induced by acquisitions of local TV stations by a large broadcast group, Sinclair. Using a unique dataset of 8.5 million news stories and a triple differences design, we document that Sinclair ownership decreases news coverage of local crime. This matters for policing: municipalities that experience the change in news coverage have lower violent crime clearance rates relative to municipalities that do not. The result is consistent with a decrease of crime salience in the public opinion. JEL: K42, D73.

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The media is a fundamental determinant of government responsiveness. By providing information to the public, the media helps citizens select public officials who hold positions that are in line with their policy preferences (Berry and Howell (2007), Snyder Jr and Strömberg (2010), Lim, Snyder Jr and Strömberg (2015*a*)). In addition, by focusing on certain topics at the expense of others, the media impacts what issues are salient to citizens (Eisensee and Strömberg (2007), Djourelova (2023)) and, in turn, which policies public officials decide to implement (Clinton and Enamorado (2014), Arceneaux et al. (2016), Durante and Zhuravskaya (2018)). In this paper, we explore the relationship between media content and public officials' responsiveness by focusing on a specific type of news—news about crime on local TV stations—and a specific bureaucracy municipal police departments in the United States. We find that the police respond to media content: a decline in news coverage of local crime is reflected into lower violent crime clearance rates, our proxy for police behavior.

The question of responsiveness is particularly relevant for the police. On the one hand, the fact that police officers are protected by civil service systems and strong union contracts implies that explicit re-election incentives are absent. On the other, because police chiefs are appointed (and removed at will) by the head of local government, their incentives tend to be aligned with those of the municipality's administration (Owens (2020)). To the extent that perceptions of public safety matter for local politicians (Levitt (1997)), the police might respond to them as well.

This raises the question of how perceptions of public safety are shaped, and it is where the media comes in. The fact that most people do not have direct experience with the criminal justice system (Owens and Ba (2021)) makes news coverage of crime particularly relevant for public safety perceptions, more so than actual crime rates (see, among others, Esberg and Mummolo (2018),

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Ajzenman, Dominguez and Undurraga (2023), Mastrorocco and Minale (2018)). In addition, local news tend to have a strong crime focus: in local TV news—the focus of our study—crime is the most popular topic, appearing in almost 25% of all local stories. This suggests that there is scope for media content to influence police behavior, which is the question we investigate in this paper.

The key challenge to addressing the question of how news coverage of local crime impacts police behavior is that we expect profit-maximizing media outlets to cater to demand for news on topics that are already prominent: i.e., media coverage is endogenous to salience. We overcome this challenge by exploiting a shock in the local news environment induced by acquisitions of local TV stations by a large broadcast group, Sinclair.

Sinclair ownership affects content in two ways. First, it reduces coverage of local events in favor of a national focus. This gives us variation in news coverage of local crime, which is the change in content that we are interested in identifying. But in addition to this, Sinclair—a right-leaning media group—also makes content more conservative. The need to disentangle the effect of these two changes in content is why we cannot rely on a simple differences-in-differences design exploiting the staggered timing of Sinclair acquisitions to answer our research question.

Instead, we combine the staggered timing of Sinclair entry in different media markets with variation across municipalities in exposure to the local news shock in a triple differences design. This research design relies on the fact that the relevant geography for local TV stations is a media market, by definition a region in which all households have access to the same TV stations. This means that, once Sinclair acquires a station, all municipalities that belong to the station's media market experience its conservative messaging. However, there is large variation in the extent to which municipalities are exposed to the decline in the station's coverage of local crime.

The proxy for exposure that we use is the baseline probability that a municipality appears in the news. The intuition for this is that municipalities often in the news at baseline (i.e., covered municipalities) should bear the brunt of the decline in coverage of local crime. Instead, municipalities that were never in the news in the first place (i.e., non-covered municipalities) are also not going to be in the news after Sinclair acquires a station: they do not experience any change in news coverage of local crime. As a result, they give us the counterfactual of how clearance rates would have evolved in covered municipalities in the absence of the decline in news coverage of local crime.

Identification rests on covered and non-covered municipalities being on parallel trends. In addition, Sinclair's decision to acquire a station must not be driven by differential trends in the two types of municipalities. Finally, non-covered municipalities must not themselves experience a change in news coverage of local crime. We provide supportive evidence for all these points through a series of additional analyses.

We begin by characterizing in detail how Sinclair ownership affects news coverage of local crime using a novel dataset containing the transcripts of almost 8.5 million stories in 300,000 local TV newscasts. We find that ownership matters for content. After Sinclair acquires a station, covered municipalities are 1.8 percentage points (20% of the baseline mean) less likely to be mentioned in a crime story relative to non-covered municipalities. In line with the intuition behind the research design, the effect is explained by a large decline in the probability that covered municipalities appear in the news with a crime story, while non-covered municipalities do not experience any change. While the quantity of coverage of non-local crime is not affected by Sinclair acquisitions, its slant does: after Sinclair acquires a station, coverage of police misconduct declines and mentions of drugs and immigrants in the context of crime increase.

The police respond to the decline in news coverage of local crime. After Sinclair enters a media market, covered municipalities experience 3.3 percentage points (7.2% of the baseline outcome mean) lower violent crime clearance rates relative to non-covered municipalities. The effect is explained by non-covered municipalities experiencing an increase in their violent crime clearance rate, perhaps as a consequence of media market trends or of Sinclair's slant when covering (non local) crime-related news. In covered municipalities instead, this increase is completely offset by the

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negative effect of the decline in news coverage of local crime. This further highlights the importance of using a triple differences design to separately identify the consequences of the twofold change in content.

In contrast, property crime clearance rates do not experience a similar decline, which is potentially consistent with local TV news having a strong violent crime focus. We document this in our data by training a classifier model to identify whether local crime stories are about a violent or a property crime. We show that 91% of the stories are about a violent crime and only 17% are about a property crime (8% are about both), a difference which is even starker if we consider that property crimes are significantly more common. Our unique content data underpin one of the most novel contributions of the paper: the ability to characterize in detail the content shock and, as a result, precisely map content changes into police actions.

We interpret these results through the lenses of public officials' responsiveness. When stories about a municipality's violent crimes are less common in the news, the topic of crime loses salience in the eyes of local citizens and the police find themselves operating in a political environment where there is less pressure to clear violent crimes. As a result, the police reallocate their resources away from clearing these crimes in favor of other policing-related activities. Three pieces of evidence are consistent with this explanation. First, we show using both Google Trends data and individual-level survey data from Gallup that the salience of crime is indeed lower after Sinclair enters a media market. Second, we note that the key audience of local news, individuals over 55, are also an important interest group for local politics and law enforcement in particular (Goldstein (2021)). In line with this, the effect is driven precisely by those municipalities where individuals over 55 constitute a larger share of the population. Finally, we document an increase in low-level arrests in covered relative to non-covered municipalities after Sinclair enters a media market, which is consistent with the police reallocating their resources to other policing-related activities. Overall, we interpret this evidence as supporting the idea of a feedback mechanism from salience to police behavior through citizens' and politicians' pressure.

We contribute to several strands of literature within the economics of media. First, by showing that ownership matters for content, we relate to recent studies focusing on the news generation process ('supply side') of media outlets (Angelucci, Cage and Sinkinson (2022), Tiew (2022), Cage, Herve and Viaud (2019) and L'Heude (2023)). From the policy perspective, the fact that ownershipinduced changes impact real world outcomes suggests that increasing ownership concentration, a trend which characterizes not only the local TV industry (Stahl (2016)) but also other media types such as newspapers (Hendrickson (2019)), might have tangible externalities (Prat (2018)). Second, by showing that even an organization that is generally considered to be insulated from external forces such as the police is responsive to media content, we add to those works demonstrating that what the media talks about influences public officials' behavior and accountability (Ferraz and Finan (2011), Snyder Jr and Strömberg (2010) and Lim, Snyder Jr and Strömberg (2015b)). The novel content dataset we construct tracks news coverage of 325 stations weekly from 2010 to 2017, a significantly larger time and geographic coverage with respect to previous studies of local TV news (see, for example, Moskowitz (2021)). This allows us to not only quantify content changes. but also document their timing, and precisely map how content influences policy. In addition, we provide evidence that public officials' responsiveness can be explained by media-induced changes in perceptions. The two papers that are closest to ours in this sense are Ash and Galletta (2023) and Ash and Poyker (2024), which study how Fox News influences local government spending and judges' sentencing decisions. We add to these papers by studying the role played by crime news in influencing crime perceptions and police behavior. Finally, we also link to studies showing how media bias can have real impact on individuals' beliefs and behaviors (DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), Martin and Yurukoglu (2017)).

In addition, our findings contribute to the growing literature aimed at understanding the determinants of police behavior (see, among others, Ba (2020), Chalfin and Goncalves (2023), Dharmapala, McAdams and Rappaport (2022), Grosjean, Masera and Yousaf (2023), Stashko (2022)) and the role played by institutional level incentives in particular (Makowsky and Stratmann (2009), Thompson (2020), Goldstein, Sances and You (2020)). To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first studies to provide causal evidence on how crime news influences the police. It is particularly interesting to contrast our finding that a reduction in news coverage of local crime decreases clearance rates with the evidence that increases in monitoring following scandals can have the same effect (Ba and Rivera (Forthcoming), Premkumar (2022), Devi and Fryer Jr (2020)). The two results can be rationalized by the attention change being of a very different nature: negative outside pressure following scandals is likely to be have very different effects than increases in crime salience driven by media coverage of crime.

# I. Background

# A. Local TV News

Local TV news is a central source of information for many Americans (Gottfried and Shearer (2017), Matsa (2018)). This is especially true in small and medium sized markets (Wenger and Papper (2018)) and among individuals older than 50 years old, who make up the core audience of local TV news (Wenger and Papper (2018)).

Newscasts of local TV stations include both national and media market-specific stories. Figure 1 Panel (a) shows that approximately 30% of stories are specific to the media market (i.e., they mention at least one same media market municipality with more than 10,000 people). Crime is a prime subject of local TV news: 22% of all local stories are crime-related (13% overall). We confirm the crime focus of local TV newscasts by training an unsupervised Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) topic model with five topics on the 2 million local stories in our content data.<sup>1</sup> Figure 1 Panel (b) shows the average topic shares. Apart from a miscellaneous topic with no clear meaning, the most covered topic is crime (with a share of 25%), followed by politics (20.5%), weather (16%), and sports (12.5%).

# B. The Sinclair Broadcast Group

Since 2010, the local TV market in the United States has seen a stark increase in ownership concentration, primarily explained by the emergence of large broadcast groups owning a significant share of local TV stations (Matsa (2017)). We focus on one of the most active players in the local TV market: the Sinclair Broadcast Group. As Figure 2 Panel (a) shows, Sinclair went from owning 33 stations in January 2010 to 117 in December 2017. This corresponds to about 14% of all big-four affiliates. Acquisitions have taken place in media markets across the country (Figure 2 Panel (b)), although Sinclair was particularly active in mediamarkets.

With respect to other broadcast groups, Sinclair holds a right-leaning political orientation (Miho (2023)) and appears to be particularly interested in controlling the messaging of its stations (Fortin and Bromwich (2018)). Existing research supports the anecdotal evidence. Martin and McCrain (2019) show using a differences-in-differences design that when Sinclair bought the Bonten Media Group in 2017, the ideological slant of Bonten stations moved to the right. Miho (2023) shows that Sinclair's conservative leaning might have real word effects, with exposure to Sinclair-owned stations increasing the Republican vote share in presidential elections. In addition, Martin and McCrain (2019) also show that Sinclair ownership increases national coverage, mostly at the expense of local

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Looking at the tokens with the highest weight for the five topics shows that four of the five topics can be easily identified to be related to crime, politics, weather, and sports (Appendix Figure 1A and Appendix Figure 1B). The last topic appears to be a miscellaneous topic with no clear meaning.



FIGURE 1. LOCAL TV NEWS CONTENT

*Note:* This figure describes local TV news content. Panel (a) shows the share of stories that are local, that are about crime, and both local and about crime. A story is local if it mentions at least one of the municipalities with more than 10,000 people in the media market. A story is about crime if it contains a "crime bigram" (i.e., a bigram that is much more likely to appear in crime-related stories than in non-crime related ones of the Metropolitan Desk Section of the New York Times). For more details, see Section II. Panel (b) shows the mean topic share from an unsupervised LDA topic model trained on local stories. In both panels, the sample is restricted to media markets that never experienced Sinclair entry.

stories. These content changes have limited negative effects on viewership, at least in the very short run.

### II. Data and Measurement

This paper combines multiple data sources.

**Station Data.** Our starting sample includes 835 full-powered commercial TV stations that are affiliated to one of the big four networks (see Appendix A for more details). Information on the market served by each station and yearly network affiliation 2010-2017 is from BIA/Kelsey (BIA/Kelsey (2017)), an advisory firm focusing on the media industry.

Sinclair Ownership. We collect the dates in which stations started being owned by Sinclair from the group's annual reports to shareholders, which we complement using the BIA/Kelsey data (Mastrorocco and Ornaghi (2024)). With a slight abuse of terminology, we consider a station as being under Sinclair ownership if the station is owned and operated by Sinclair, if it is owned and operated by Cunningham Broadcasting, or if the station has entered into a local marketing agreement with Sinclair.<sup>2</sup>

**Newscast Transcripts.** To study how Sinclair ownership affects content, we use transcripts of local TV newscasts from ShadowTV (ShadowTV (2018)), a media monitoring company. For each station, we collect the closed caption transcripts of all evening newscasts (5-9pm) for a randomly selected day per week. The data cover 325 stations in 113 media markets from 2010 to 2017, for a total of 293,045 newscasts. We segment each transcript into separate stories using an automated procedure based on content similarity across sentences described in Appendix B. This gives us 8.5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Sinclair has a controlling interest in Cunningham Broadcasting, although it does not have a majority of voting rights. At the end of 2017, the estate of Carolyn C. Smith (the mother of the two controlling shareholders of Sinclair) owned all of the voting stock of Cunningham Broadcasting. The strong ties between Sinclair and Cunningham are also evidenced by the fact that most Cunningham stations are at least partly operated by Sinclair through local marketing agreements or joint sales agreements. Local marketing agreements give Sinclair control over the programming of a station owned by a third party. 90% of the stations we consider owned by Sinclair are owned and operated by Sinclair directly (see Appendix Table 1).



FIGURE 2. SINCLAIR OWNERSHIP OVER TIME AND SPACE

*Note:* Panel (a) shows the number of big-four affiliate stations controlled by Sinclair in each month from January 2010 to December 2017. A station is considered controlled by Sinclair if it is owned and operated by the Sinclair Broadcast Group, if it is owned and operated by Cunningham Broadcasting, or if Sinclair controls programming through a local marketing agreement. Panel (b) shows year of Sinclair entry across media markets in the United States. Lighter colors correspond to later entry. Never treated are media markets that never experience Sinclair entry; always treated are media markets that have at least one station controlled by Sinclair at the beginning of the period of interest (January 2010). There were no additional stations that were acquired in 2010.

million separate stories.

We use the segmented transcripts to measure whether a municipality appears in a crime story using the following procedure:

- 1) We define a story to be about a municipality if the name of the municipality appears in it.
- 2) We identify whether a story is about crime using a pattern-based sequence-classification method similar to the one used by Hassan et al. (2019) to identify firms' exposure to political risk from quarterly earnings calls. The method defines a story to be about crime if it contains a bigram that is much more likely to appear in an external pre-tagged crime-related library (crime articles from the New York Times's Metropolitan Desk section 2010-2012) as opposed to a non-crime-related one (all other Metropolitan Desk articles over the same time period). The text of the articles is from Factiva (2019).

This procedure identifies 179 crime bigrams. The crime bigrams are quite general and make intuitive sense (Appendix Figure 2A and Appendix Figure 2B). Importantly, they do not display an ideological view of crime, which lowers the concern of measurement error systematically varying with Sinclair ownership.

Two pieces of evidence validate the procedure. First, the share of local stories about crime that we identify with our methodology (22%) is very similar to the overall weight of the crime topic (25%) (see Figure 1). Second, stories about crime have significantly higher crime topic shares than stories not about crime (see Appendix Figure 3). This suggests that the procedure we follow successfully identifies crime stories.

3) We create an indicator variable equal to one if a given municipality was mentioned in a crime story by a given station in a given week.

Our starting sample is composed by stations that are continuously present in the content data 2010-2017 and same media market municipalities that have more than 10,000 people. We exclude

smaller municipalities as they receive a negligible share of overall coverage and to increase the comparability of the sample. To maximize sample size in the presence of short gaps in the content data, we replace missing observations in spells shorter than two consecutive months using linear interpolation. The resulting sample includes 325 stations and 2253 municipalities in 113 media markets. Appendix B provides more details.

**Crime and Clearance Data.** Crime and clearance counts 2009-2017 are from the "Offenses Known and Clearances by Arrest" dataset of the Uniform Crime Reports (UCRs) (Federal Bureau of Investigation (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018); Kaplan (2018)).<sup>3</sup> UCRs are compiled from returns voluntarily submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by police departments. UCRs report monthly counts of offenses known to the police and counts of offenses cleared for three property crimes (burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft) and four violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault), which we aggregate at the yearly level.<sup>4</sup> We use these data to study clearance rates, defined as cleared crimes over total crimes and crime rates, defined as crimes per 1,000 people under the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation.<sup>5</sup> In addition, we use the "Arrests by Age, Sex, and Race" dataset (Kaplan (2021)), which include arrest counts (but no offense counts) for a broader set of offenses, to study arrests for low-level offenses.

UCR data may contain record errors and need extensive cleaning, as shown by Evans and Owens (2007) and Maltz and Weiss (2006). Following the state of the art in the crime literature (see, among others, Chalfin and McCrary (2018), Mello (2019), Premkumar (2022)), we use a regression-based method to identify and correct record errors, and define crime rates using a smoothed version of the population reported in the UCRs. We describe the data cleaning procedure in detail in Appendix B. Finally, we winsorize crime and clearance rates at the 99% level to minimize the influence of outliers.

Our starting sample is composed by municipalities with more than 10,000 people with a municipal police department. To create a balanced sample, we exclude municipalities that do not continuously report crime data to the FBI and do not have at least one violent and one property crime in every year. In addition, the empirical strategy requires restricting the sample to municipalities located in media markets included in the content data. Our final sample includes 1792 municipalities.<sup>6</sup> Appendix B provides more details.

**Municipality Characteristics.** Municipality population in 2010 is from the Census Bureau (2017b) while other characteristics are from the 2006-2010 American Community Survey (Manson et al. (2019)). Since municipal election results are not available at a sufficiently large scale, we focus on presidential elections and construct the Republican vote share in 2008 aggregating precinct level returns from the Harvard Election Data archive (Ansolabehere, Palmer and Lee (2014)) to the

 $^{6}$ The sample for the content analysis includes 461 municipalities not in the police behavior analysis. These are municipalities with more than 10,000 people in media markets for which we have content data, but that do not satisfy the conditions to be included in the police behavior analysis (for example, because they might continuously report data to the UCR). We include them in order to maximize power, but show in Appendix D that this does not affect our results.

 $<sup>^{3}</sup>$ Note that we match municipal police departments and municipalities using a crosswalk provided by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2018).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>We aggregate the data at the yearly level for two reasons. First, clearance rates are undefined if there are no offenses over the time period considered. Aggregating the data at the yearly level allows us to create a balanced sample without sacrificing sample size. Second, there is no correspondence between the crimes that are reported as being cleared in a certain month and the offenses taking place in that month, although the vast majority of arrests happen relatively close to the date of the incident. Using the yearly data minimizes this mismatch.

 $<sup>^{5}</sup>$ A crime is considered cleared if at least one person has been arrested, charged, and turned over for prosecution or if the offender has been identified, but external circumstances prevent an arrest. We use as our main outcome clearance rates (rather than, for example, clearance counts) because there is large variation in the number of crimes that municipalities in our sample experience every year and as a result, we believe it is important to normalize clearances by number of crimes to be able to interpret clearances as a proxy for police performance. In line with this, papers studying crime and policing often define clearance rates using indicator variables equal to one if the crime has been cleared when incident-level data is available (see, for example, Blanes i Vidal and Kirchmaier (2018), Mastrobuoni (2020), Facchetti (2023)) or the aggregate version in shares (see, for example, Garicano and Heaton (2010), Goldstein, Sances and You (2020), Hausman (2020)). We take the IHS transformation for crime rates because they are highly skewed.

municipal level.<sup>7</sup> When these are not available ( $\sim 10\%$  of the sample), we assign to the municipality the Republican vote share of the county the municipality is located in. County level returns are from the MIT Election Data and Science Lab (2017).

Media Market Characteristics. Media market characteristics are from the Census Bureau (2017a), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010-2017), and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2018)). Turnout and Republican vote share in presidential elections are from the MIT Election Data and Science Lab (2017). In all cases, we start from county level data and aggregate them to the media market level.

**Police Expenditures and Employment.** Data on police departments' employment are from the UCRs' "Law Enforcement Officers Killed in Action" dataset (Kaplan (2020)). We supplement these data with expenditures and employment 2010-2016 from the Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances (Census Bureau (2008-2016a)) and the State and Local Government Employment & Payroll dataset (Census Bureau (2008-2016a)).

**Google Trends.** To study the effect of Sinclair on the salience of crime, we collect data on monthly Google searches containing the terms "crime", "police", "youtube", and "weather" at the media market level using the Google Trends API (Google (2020), see Appendix B for more details).

**Gallup.** We use data from the Gallup Poll Social Series 2010-2017 (Gallup (2010–2017)), a set of public opinion surveys, to define an indicator variable equal to one if at least one respondent living in the municipality reports crime as being the most important problem facing the country (see Appendix B for more details).

# A. Descriptive Statistics

In Appendix Table 2, we report descriptive statistics for the main variables considered in the analysis and municipality characteristics. The average municipality was mentioned in 27% of news-casts in 2010 and appeared with a local crime story in 10% of them, while the average violent crime clearance rate was 0.461.

Our sample is restricted to municipalities for which we have coverage information, which might raise concerns related to the external validity of our findings. However, the content sample has good geographic coverage (see Appendix Figure 4). In addition, comparing the municipalities included in our analysis with municipalities with more than 10,000 people that satisfy the conditions to be included in the police behavior analysis, but we do not have coverage information for, shows that the samples are highly comparable (see Appendix Table 2).

# III. Empirical Strategy

The objective of this paper is to study how TV news coverage of a municipality's crime impacts police behavior, for which we proxy using data on clearance rate. The major challenge to answering this question is finding a shock to news coverage of local crime that is exogenous to clearance rates. We address this issue by exploiting a change in content that is driven by acquisitions of local TV stations by a large broadcast group, Sinclair.

Figure 2 shows that Sinclair entry is staggered across space and time, which suggests we could use a differences-in-differences design to study its effect. However, this would not allow us to identify the treatment of interest. This is because the shock to news content induced by Sinclair is twofold. First, when Sinclair acquires control over a station, newscasts increase their national focus to the detriment of local coverage (*effect* #1). This gives us variation in news coverage of local crime, which is the change in content we are interested in identifying. But in addition to this, because

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>To match precincts to municipalities, we use the zipcode shapefile provided by the Census Bureau (2014).

Sinclair is a right-leaning media group, acquisitions make content more conservative (*effect* #2), which might also affect the way in which crime and police are discussed.

To disentangle the effect of these two changes in content, we make use of the fact that the relevant geography for a local TV station is a media market: by definition, an area where all households receive the same TV offerings. This means that all municipalities in media markets that Sinclair enters experience its conservative messaging. However, not all municipalities are equally exposed to the change in the probability of appearing in the news with a crime story. Our empirical strategy is a triple differences design that combines variation from the staggered timing of Sinclair entry with cross-sectional variation across municipalities in whether they are covered by the news at baseline, our proxy for exposure to the local news shock.<sup>8</sup> This design allows us to capture solely the effect of variation in news coverage of local crime and control for any changes in content that all municipalities in the media market are exposed to, including *effect* #2.

The intuition for using whether a municipality is covered by the news at baseline as a proxy for exposure to the local news shock is the following. If Sinclair ownership decreases local news coverage, municipalities often in the news at baseline (i.e., covered municipalities) would bear the brunt of the decline. Instead, municipalities that are never in the news in the first place (i.e., non-covered municipalities) are also not going to be in the news after Sinclair acquires control over a station. They do not experience any change, and therefore function as our control group.

We provide supporting evidence for this idea based on the fact that crime reporting is a function of a municipality's violent crime rate (see Appendix Figure 5). In particular, using unconditional binned scatter plots, we estimate the relationship between a municipality's violent crime rate and the share of weeks in a year in which the same municipality is in the news with a local crime story, separately for years before and after Sinclair acquires the station, for stations ever acquired by Sinclair. For non-covered municipalities, the probability of being in the news with a crime story is at very low levels both before and after the acquisition. For covered municipalities, higher violent crime rates are always correlated with a higher probability of being in the news with a crime story, but for every level of violent crime, crime reporting is lower after Sinclair acquires the station.

More precisely, we define a municipality to be covered if it appears in the news more than the median municipality in our baseline year, 2010.<sup>9</sup> Covered and non-covered municipalities differ on a number of characteristics: municipalities with higher population, a higher share of the population with two years of college, and a higher share of the population below the poverty line are more likely to be covered (see Appendix Figure 6). To ensure that the effect we estimate is not confounded by other municipality attributes but is truly driven by exposure, our baseline specification includes interactions between Sinclair ownership and baseline socio-economic characteristics of the municipalities. This implies that the effect is going to be driven by those idiosyncrasies that make one municipalities are especially different in population size, we check whether our results survive restricting the analysis to medium sized municipalities between 10,000 and 50,000 people.

# A. Identification

Identification in our triple differences design primarily relies on covered and non-covered municipalities being on parallel trends. As a start, we provide supporting evidence for this assumption by estimating event study specifications in which the treatment effect varies in time since Sinclair

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Nonetheless, we also estimate separate differences-in-differences designs for covered and non-covered municipalities to understand where the effect comes from. It is especially interesting to do so when we are considering clearance rates, as the effect of Sinclair entry on non-covered municipalities is informative on how conservative content affects police behavior.

 $<sup>^{9}</sup>$ We begin by calculating the share of weeks a municipality is mentioned in the news in 2010. If we have data for multiple stations in the same media market, we assign to each municipality the median share of weeks a municipality is mentioned in the news across the different stations. Finally, we define an indicator variable equal to one if the municipality is in the news more than the median municipality in 2010, and zero otherwise.

entry. The event studies allow us to test empirically whether outcomes in covered and non-covered municipalities begin evolving differently prior to the event.

However, even if event studies show convincing patterns, we might still be concerned about contemporaneous shocks influencing both Sinclair's decision to enter a media market and the evolution of the outcome. In other words, we might worry about Sinclair entry being endogenous to demographic or economic trends. Because our triple differences specification allows us to explicitly control for any shock at the media market level that equally affects covered and non-covered municipalities, we should only be concerned about differential trends in the two groups.<sup>10</sup>

We test whether this is likely to be driving our results by checking robustness to focusing on stations that get under Sinclair control through the acquisition of a smaller broadcast group, which are less likely to be endogenous to a specific media market's conditions. Importantly, the qualitative evidence is very much in line with the no endogenous timing hypothesis, with Sinclair looking to expand and taking advantage of opportunities to acquire stations as they present themselves.<sup>11</sup>

Finally, for our triple differences design to recover the causal effect of a decline in news coverage of local crime induced by Sinclair, we also need to assume that non-covered municipalities do not themselves experience a change in news coverage of local crime. We highlight evidence suggesting that this is unlikely to be the case throughout the paper, but for now it is important to note that in media markets that never experience Sinclair entry coverage is persistent across years (Appendix Figure 7). This suggests that the likelihood of being in the news can be seen as a fixed characteristic of a municipality.

# IV. Effect of Sinclair Ownership on Coverage of Local Crime

#### A. Specification

We estimate the effect of Sinclair ownership on the probability that covered municipalities are mentioned in a crime story relative to non-covered municipalities using the following baseline specification:

(1) 
$$y_{mst} = \beta Sinclair_{st} \times Covered_m + Sinclair_{st} \times \mathbf{X}'_{m2010} \gamma + \delta_{st} + \delta_{c(m)t} + \delta_{ms} + \epsilon_{mst},$$

where  $y_{mst}$  is an indicator variable equal to one if municipality m was mentioned in a crime story by station s in week t,  $Sinclair_{st}$  is an indicator variable equal to one after a station is acquired by Sinclair,  $Covered_m$  is an indicator variable equal to one if a municipality is covered at baseline,  $\mathbf{X}_{m2010}$  are baseline municipality characteristics (log population, share male, share over 55, share black, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, share below the poverty line, and Republican vote share in the 2008 presidential election),  $\delta_{st}$  are station by week fixed effects,  $\delta_{c(m)t}$  are covered status by week fixed effects, and  $\delta_{sm}$  are municipality by station fixed effects.<sup>12</sup>

Media markets are non-overlapping but comprehensive geographies. Each municipality and each station belong to a specific media market, but multiple stations are active in the same media market (because we focus on big-four affiliates, we generally have around four stations per media market).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>While we find no change in media markets' socio-economic characteristics following Sinclair entry (Appendix Table 3), the fact that our design allows us to control for observable and unobservable trends strengthens the credibility of the results.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>For example, when Barrington's stations went on the market in 2012, both Sinclair and Nexstar (another large broadcast group) got to final talks for the acquisitions. Moreover, Allbritton's decision to put its stations on the market was mainly driven by the company's decision to focus its resources on Politico.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Our specification differs from a standard triple difference specification that would include a triple interaction (*Sinclair<sub>s</sub>* × *Post<sub>t</sub>* × *Covered<sub>m</sub>*) because of the staggered nature of the Sinclair acquisitions, which means we cannot separately define *Sinclair<sub>s</sub>* and *Post<sub>t</sub>* variables. The terms part our main interaction are not separately included because they are absorbed by the fixed effects (*Sinclair<sub>st</sub>* by  $\delta_{st}$  and *Covered<sub>m</sub>* by  $\delta_{ms}$ ).

Given that the outcome is station and municipality specific, the cross-sectional unit of analysis is the municipality-station pair. More precisely, we estimate the regression on a municipality-station pair by week balanced panel that only includes pairs where the station and the municipality belong to the same media market. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level.

The station by week fixed effects  $(\delta_{st})$  control non-parametrically for station specific shocks in content that are common to all the municipalities of the media market, while covered status by week fixed effects  $(\delta_{c(m)t})$  allow the two different types of municipalities to be on different trends. Municipality by station fixed effects  $(\delta_{sm})$  control for station-specific level differences across municipalities, including level differences explained by non-time-varying measurement error due to how stories are assigned to municipalities.<sup>13</sup> Finally, the inclusion of baseline controls interacted with the Sinclair treatment (*Sinclair<sub>st</sub>* ×  $\mathbf{X}'_{m2010}$ ) ensures that we estimate an effect that is truly driven by baseline news coverage, and not some other municipality characteristics that just happens to correlate with it and the outcome.

We provide evidence supporting the parallel trends assumption by estimating an event study version of the baseline specification that allows the effect to vary in time since Sinclair ownership. In particular, we estimate the following specification:

(2) 
$$y_{mst} = \sum_{y=1}^{T_{min}} \beta_y \times Pre_{t-y,s} \times Covered_m + \sum_{y=0}^{T_{max}} \gamma_y \times Post_{t+y,s} \times Covered_m + \delta_{st} + \delta_{c(m)t} + \delta_{ms} + \epsilon_{mst},$$

where variables are defined as above. To reduce noise, we constrain the effect to be constant by year since treatment.

# B. Results

Table 1 shows the effect of Sinclair ownership on a station's coverage of crime in non-covered versus covered municipalities. We begin by estimating two separate differences-in-differences specifications, respectively restricting the sample to non-covered and covered municipalities. Column (1) shows that Sinclair ownership does not affect the crime coverage of non-covered municipalities. Instead, after Sinclair acquires a station, covered municipalities experience a large decline in the probability of being mentioned in the news with a crime story (column (2)). Pooling the sample and estimating a differences-in-differences specification that allows for the effect of Sinclair ownership to be heterogeneous by covered status confirms the same pattern (column (3)).

We estimate our triple differences specification starting from column (4). In particular, column (4) reports estimates from a specification that only controls for the fixed effects, while column (5) additionally includes the interaction between Sinclair and socio-economic characteristics of the municipality at baseline (equation (1)). Using our preferred specification, we find that after Sinclair acquires a station, covered municipalities are 1.8 percentage points less likely to appear in the news with a crime story relative to non-covered municipalities. The effect is significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the effect is large, corresponding to almost 20% of the baseline mean. The coefficient is smaller in size but similar in magnitude, corresponding to 28% of the baseline mean, if

 $<sup>^{13}</sup>$ We assign a story to a municipality if the municipality's name is mentioned in the story. This might give rise both to false positives (e.g., mentions of "Paris, France" might be counted for "Paris, TX") and false negatives (e.g., neighborhoods might be mentioned instead of municipalities, or unusual municipality names might be more likely to be misspelled in the close captioned text). We can account for both types of measurement error using the municipality by station fixed effects, as long as the error is stable over time. A potential concern is that Sinclair's increased focus on national news might increase the probability of false positives for municipalities that have the same name as nationally relevant places. However, to the extent that these municipalities are more likely to be covered in the first place, the effect should go in the opposite direction to our findings.

Dependent Variable	Had a Local Crime Story						
Municipalities	Non-Covered	Covered		All			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Sinclair	-0.004 (0.003)	$-0.034^{**}$ (0.013)	-0.004 (0.003)				
Sinclair * Covered		· /	$-0.030^{**}$ (0.012)	$-0.023^{***}$ (0.007)	$-0.018^{***}$ (0.007)	$-0.014^{**}$ (0.006)	$-0.019^{***}$ (0.007)
Non-Sinclair Stations in Sinclair			· · ·	× ,	~ /	. ,	-0.007 (0.006)
Observations	1643158	1500202	3143360	3143360	3143360	2398902	3143360
Clusters	90	113	113	113	113	111	113
Municipalities	1108	1145	2253	2253	2253	1715	2253
Stations	278	325	325	325	325	323	325
Outcome Mean in 2010	0.017	0.174	0.092	0.092	0.092	0.050	0.092
P-value Sinclair = Other							0.104
Station By Municipality FE	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
Week FE	Х	Х					
Covered By Week FE			Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
Station By Week FE				Х	Х	Х	Х
Sinclair * Controls					Х	Х	Х
Restricts Sample 10k-50k						Х	

TABLE 1—EFFECT OF SINCLAIR OWNERSHIP ON THE PROBABILITY OF HAVING A LOCAL CRIME STORY

Note: This table shows the effect of Sinclair ownership on the probability that a station reports local crime stories about covered municipalities relative to non-covered municipalities. Columns (1) and (2) estimate a differences-in-differences specification restricting the sample to non-covered and covered municipalities respectively. In this specification, we regress the outcome on an indicator variable for the station being owned by Sinclair, station by municipality fixed effects, and week fixed effects. In column (3), we estimate a differences-in-differences specification with heterogeneous treatment effects for covered and noncovered municipalities using the full sample. Specifically, we regress the outcome on an indicator variable for the station being owned by Sinclair, the interaction between an indicator variable for the station being owned by Sinclair and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline, station by municipality fixed effects, and covered status by week fixed effects. Column (4) additionally controls for station by week fixed effects. Column (5) reports estimates from our baseline specification (equation (3)), where we also control for the interaction between an indicator variable for the station being owned by Sinclair and baseline municipality characteristics. The characteristics included are log population, share male, share over 55, share black, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, share below the poverty line, and Republican vote share in the 2008 presidential election. Column (6) restricts the sample to municipalities with fewer than 50,000 people. Finally, column (7) also includes the interaction between an indicator variable for being in the same media market as a station owned by Sinclair and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline. The p-value reported in column (7) is from a test of the difference between the effect of Sinclair entry on the station owned by Sinclair and the other stations in the same media market. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality-station pair by week panel. There are multiple stations in each media market covering the same municipalities, and the municipality-station pair is the cross-sectional unit of interest. Treatment is defined at the monthly level. Covered municipalities are mentioned in the news more than the median municipality in 2010.

we exclude municipalities with more than 50,000 people to increase the comparability of the sample (column (6)). For a detailed discussion of the robustness of this result to how we clean the data and how we define Sinclair ownership, we refer the reader to Appendix D.

**Event Study.** We provide evidence supporting the assumption that covered and non-covered municipalities are on parallel trends leading up to the Sinclair acquisition in Figure 3, which reports the  $\beta_y$  and  $\gamma_y$  coefficient estimates from equation (2), together with 95% confidence intervals. The figure shows no difference between covered and non-covered municipalities in the four years leading up to Sinclair ownership. Immediately after Sinclair acquires the station, covered municipalities become less likely than non-covered municipalities to appear in the news with a crime story. The effect in the first year is large in magnitude and almost comparable to the point estimate from the triple differences specification. After this, the effect becomes larger over time, almost doubling by year three.

Same Media Market Stations. Our result might reflect an underlying change in a municipality's crime prevalence or demand for crime stories. To examine whether this is the case, we replicate our baseline model but also look at the coverage of local crime of stations that are in the



FIGURE 3. EFFECT OF SINCLAIR OWNERSHIP ON THE PROBABILITY OF HAVING A LOCAL CRIME STORY, BY YEAR SINCE TREAT-MENT

*Note:* This figure shows the effect of Sinclair ownership on the probability that a station reports local crime stories about covered municipalities relative to non-covered municipalities, by year since treatment. We report coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of an indicator variable for the station reporting a local crime story about the municipality on the interaction between indicator variables for years since Sinclair acquired the station and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline, station by week fixed effects, covered status by week fixed effects, and station by municipality fixed effects (equation (2)). The sample excludes always treated municipality-station pairs. The omitted category is T-1. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality-station pair by week panel. There are multiple stations in each media market covering the same municipalities, and the municipality-station pair is the same by year since treatment. Covered municipalities are mentioned in the news more than the median municipality in 2010.

same media market as stations that are acquired by Sinclair, but are not themselves bought by the group. To do so, we estimate equation (2) including similarly defined leads and lags for same media market stations that are not under Sinclair controls (Appendix Figure 8). In the four years leading up to the Sinclair acquisition, we find no difference in how Sinclair and non-Sinclair stations report about crime in covered relative to non-covered municipalities. Once Sinclair enters the media market, we only see a decrease in local crime coverage by Sinclair stations. Table 1 confirms the result (*p*-value of a test of equality of the effect of Sinclair entry on Sinclair and non-Sinclair stations = 0.104). This evidence supports the interpretation that decreasing local crime coverage is an editorial decision on the part of Sinclair and that there are limited spillovers of Sinclair's change in content to other outlets in the media market.

**Slant of Crime Coverage.** Do Sinclair acquisitions affect coverage of non-local crime? Estimating differences-in-differences specifications at the station level, we find that after Sinclair acquires a station, there is no change in the share of stories about non-local crime or police. However, while the volume of non-local crime stories is unaffected, Sinclair acquisitions induce coverage of non-local crime to be more closely aligned with conservative narratives. After Sinclair acquires a station, the station is less likely to mention police misconduct, more likely to mention crime and drugs, and more likely to mention crime and immigrants (see Appendix Table 4 for more details). This change in the slant of crime coverage, which impacts both covered and non-covered municipalities, further underlines the need to estimate a triple differences specification to avoid conflating the effect of different changes in content.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup>Instead, the slant of coverage of local crime does not appear to be impacted by Sinclair acquisitions (Appendix Table 5).

Other Types of Local News. In light of the results in Table 1, it is natural to ask to what extent the decline in local coverage is specific to crime news. Sinclair ownership lowers the probability that a station reports a story about covered municipalities relative to non-covered municipalities by 3.2 percentage points or 13% of the baseline mean (see Appendix Table 6). However, the effect is much larger in magnitude for crime compared to non-crime stories (23% versus 10%). We interpret this result as supporting the idea that the effects on police behavior that we identify are related to the change in local coverage of crime, and not the result of decreased coverage of other non-crime events.

Heterogeneity by Political Leaning of the Municipality. Since Sinclair is a conservative media group, we might worry that the decline in coverage could be influenced by political considerations. For example, Sinclair entry might affect differently the typology and the quantity of coverage of Democrat- and Republican-leaning municipalities. Ideally, we would test this possibility using election results for municipal-level races. Unfortunately, these data are not widely available, especially for smaller municipalities (de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw (2016)). We get around this problem by using electoral results in presidential elections as a proxy for a municipality's partisanship. In particular, we split the sample by whether the municipality's Republican vote share was above the median or below the median in the 2008 presidential election (Appendix Table 7). We find that the effect is very similar for Democratic- and Republican-leaning municipalities = 0.768). This suggests limited scope for strategic coverage decisions based on political considerations, although we acknowledge that this analysis is indicative in nature because of data limitations.

## V. Effect of Sinclair Entry on Clearance Rates

# A. What Should We Expect?

In Section IV we document that when a local TV station is acquired by Sinclair, covered municipalities become less likely to appear in the news with a local crime story relative to non-covered municipalities. This decline may have tangible implications: in this section, we investigate whether the decline in news coverage of local crime impacts clearance rates.

Crime clearances are highly sensitive to what resources are allocated to investigations.<sup>15</sup> As a result, clearances are often used to study police behavior (see, among others, Mas (2006), Shi (2009), and Premkumar (2022)). They are especially interesting in our setting as they allow us to consider whether the types of crimes that get prioritized by police departments are affected by news coverage.

However, not all crime types are equally likely to be reported in the news: we should expect clearance rates of different crimes to respond differently, depending on how important news coverage is for them. We focus in particular on the difference in news coverage of property versus violent crimes, which we explore in our content data by training a classifier model to identify the type of crime a local crime story is about (see Appendix C for more details). We use the resulting classification in two ways.

First, in Appendix Figure 9 Panel (a), we show that local news have a clear violent crime focus: 91% of local crime stories are about violent crimes, while only 17% are about property crimes (8% are about both). The difference in reporting across crime types is even sharper if we consider the fact that violent crimes are relatively rare, while property crimes are significantly more common. In Appendix Figure 9 Panel (b), we normalize the number of crime stories of a given type that were reported about a municipality in 2010 by the number of offenses of the same type for the same

 $<sup>^{15}</sup>$ For example, Blanes i Vidal and Kirchmaier (2017) show that increases in the response time to crime calls have a negative effect on the probability that a crime is cleared. In addition, Cook et al. (2019) show that the involvement of a specialized detective squad also increases the probability that a crime is cleared in the medium run.

municipality. There are approximately 0.25 stories for each violent crime, while property crimes, at 0.003 stories per offense, receive negligible news coverage.

Second, we test whether Sinclair ownership has a different effect on local news coverage of violent and property crimes. After Sinclair acquires a station, covered municipalities are 1.7 percentage points (19% of the baseline mean) less likely to appear in the news with a story about a violent crime relative to non-covered municipalities (Appendix Table 8). Instead, they are not significantly less likely to appear in the news with a story about a property crime.

Taken together, these two pieces of evidence suggest that we should expect an effect on the clearance rate of violent rather than property crimes.

# B. Specification

We estimate the relative effect of Sinclair entry on violent crime clearance rates of covered relative to non-covered municipalities using the following baseline specification:

(3) 
$$y_{mt} = \beta Sinclair_{d(m)t} \times Covered_m + Sinclair_{d(m)t} \times \mathbf{X}'_{m2010}\gamma + \delta_{d(m)t} + \delta_{c(m)t} + \delta_m + \epsilon_{mt},$$

where  $y_{mt}$  is the violent crime clearance rate in municipality m in year t,  $Sinclair_{d(m)t}$  is an indicator variable equal to one after Sinclair enters a media market,  $Covered_m$  is an indicator variable equal to one if the municipality is covered at baseline,  $\mathbf{X}_{m2010}$  are baseline municipality characteristics,  $\delta_{d(m)t}$  are media market by year fixed effects,  $\delta_{c(m)t}$  are covered status by year fixed effects, and  $\delta_m$ are municipality fixed effects. Note that this specification is similar to the one we use in the content analysis, modified to take into account the fact that the cross-sectional unit of interest is now the municipality (rather than the municipality-station pair). This implies that: i) the treatment is now defined at the media market rather than station level; ii) that we include media market-by-year rather than station-by-year fixed effects; and iii) that we include municipality rather than stationby-municipality fixed effects. We can aggregate the Sinclair acquisition shock to the media market level because each municipality and each station belong to a specific media market. The regression is estimated on a yearly balanced panel 2010-2017 that includes 1792 municipalities.<sup>16</sup> Standard errors are clustered at the media market level.

The media market by year fixed effects  $(\delta_{d(m)t})$  control non-parametrically for media market level shocks. This includes any non-municipality-specific change in content that is associated with Sinclair entering a media market, including increased conservative slant. In addition, these fixed effects allow us to take into account media market specific trends in demographics that might correlate with Sinclair entry. Covered status by year fixed effects  $(\delta_{c(m)t})$  allow covered and noncovered municipalities to be affected by different shocks over time, while municipalities fixed effects  $(\delta_m)$  allow for level differences across municipalities. As before, the baseline controls interacted with the Sinclair treatment  $(Sinclair_{d(m)t} \times \mathbf{X}'_{m2010})$  net out differences in coverage after the acquisition that are driven by other municipality characteristics.

We consider a media market to be treated in a given year if Sinclair owns one of the media market's stations in the January of that year: the year of treatment is the first year in which Sinclair is continuously present in the media market. This is reasonable because 88% of stations are acquired by Sinclair in the second half of the year (53% in the last trimester), which means that in most cases partially treated years only see a Sinclair presence for a couple of months. Importantly for the interpretation of our results, Sinclair entry generally corresponds to Sinclair owning one out of four stations in the media market.

 $<sup>^{16}</sup>$ Note that, in addition to media markets that experience Sinclair entry, this sample includes municipalities in both never treated and always treated media markets.

As before, we also estimate an event study specification that allows the relative effect of Sinclair entry to vary in time since treatment. In particular, we estimate the following specification:

(4) 
$$y_{mt} = \sum_{y=1}^{T_{min}} \beta_y \times Pre_{t-y,d(m)} \times Covered_m + \sum_{y=0}^{T_{max}} \gamma_y \times Post_{t+y,d(m)} \times Covered_m + \delta_{d(m)t} + \delta_{c(m)t} + \delta_m + \epsilon_{mt},$$

where all variables are defined as above.

# C. Results

Table 2 shows the effect of Sinclair entry on the violent crime clearance rate of covered relative to non-covered municipalities. As before, we begin by estimating the two separate differencesin-differences specifications that underlie our triple differences design. Column (1) shows that, after Sinclair enters a media market, the violent crime clearance rate in non-covered municipalities increases. However, we do not see a similar increase for covered municipalities. Estimating a differences-in-differences specification on the full sample but allowing the effect of Sinclair entry to be heterogeneous by covered status confirms the same pattern (column (3)): we see an increase in the violent crime clearance rates in non-covered municipalities, that is completely offset in covered municipalities.

Starting from column (4), we report the estimates from our preferred triple differences specification that allows us to estimate the effect of the decrease in coverage of local crime. In particular, column (4) reports estimates from a specification that only controls for the fixed effects, while column (5) additionally includes the interaction between Sinclair and baseline socio-economic characteristics of the municipality (equation (3)).

After Sinclair enters a media market, the violent crime clearance rate is 3.3 percentage points lower in covered than in non-covered municipalities. The effect is significant at the 5% level, and sizable in magnitude, corresponding to 7.2% of the baseline mean. To put this number in prospective, the median municipality in our sample experiences 69 violent crimes in a year and 32 violent crime clearances: a 7.2% decline in the violent crime clearance rate corresponds to approximately 2.3 fewer clearances per year. When violent crime is less covered by local news, a lower share of violent crimes gets cleared: there is scope for external forces to exert an influence on police behavior, despite the protections that strong union contracts and civil service laws extend to police officers.<sup>17</sup>

The point estimate is almost the same whether we control for the interaction between Sinclair and observable characteristics of the municipality at baseline (column (5)) or not (column (4)). This suggests that the main effect is unlikely to be explained by differential effects of Sinclair based on some other characteristic of the municipality, that just happens to be correlated with coverage. In addition, restricting the sample to municipalities with fewer than 50,000 people (column (6)) minimally affects the result, although our point estimate is no longer significant at conventional levels (*p*-value = 0.10). Our result is also robust to controlling for crime rates and population (column (7)), two factors that we might worry influence violent crime clearance rates but that we do not include in the main specification because they are potentially endogenous to the treatment. We further discuss the robustness of our main results to how we clean the data, how we define the treatment, how we identify covered municipalities, and concerns to heterogeneous effects in two-way fixed effects estimators in Appendix D.

 $<sup>^{17}</sup>$ Unfortunately, we are unable to follow clearances through the criminal justice system, and know whether they lead to a conviction or an acquittal. As a result, we cannot make inference relative to the quality of the clearances themselves, which limits our ability to draw efficiency or welfare conclusions from the analysis.

Dependent Variable	Violent Crime Clearance Rate						
Municipalities	Non-Covered	Covered	All				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Sinclair	$0.029^{*}$ (0.015)	-0.001 (0.009)	$0.029^{*}$ (0.015)				
Sinclair * Covered		( )	$-0.030^{**}$ (0.015)	$-0.031^{**}$ (0.015)	$-0.033^{**}$ (0.016)	-0.031 (0.019)	$-0.031^{*}$ (0.016)
Observations	6480	7856	14336	14336	14336	10640	14336
Clusters	86	112	112	112	112	108	112
Municipalities	810	982	1792	1792	1792	1330	1792
Outcome Mean in 2010	0.434	0.484	0.461	0.461	0.461	0.467	0.461
Municipality FE Year FE	X X	X X	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
Covered By Year FE			Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
Media Market By Year FE				Х	Х	Х	Х
Sinclair * Controls					Х	Х	Х
Restricts Sample 10k-50k						Х	
Additional Controls							Х

TABLE 2—EFFECT OF SINCLAIR ENTRY ON THE VIOLENT CRIME CLEARANCE RATE

Note: This table shows the effect of Sinclair entry on the violent crime clearance rate of covered municipalities relative to non-covered municipalities. Columns (1) and (2) estimate a differences-in-differences specification restricting the sample to non-covered and covered municipalities respectively. In this specification, we regress the outcome on an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market, municipality fixed effects, and year fixed effects. In column (3), we estimate a differencesin-differences specification with heterogeneous treatment effects for covered and non-covered municipalities using the full sample. Specifically, we regress the outcome on an indicator variable Sinclair presence in the media market, the interaction between an an indicator variable Sinclair presence in the media market and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline, municipality fixed effects, and covered status by year fixed effects. Column (4) additionally controls for media market by year fixed effects. Column (5) reports estimates from our baseline specification (equation (3)), where we also control for the interaction between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and baseline municipality characteristics. The characteristics included are log population, share male, share over 55, share black, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, share below the poverty line, and Republican vote share in the 2008 presidential election. Column (6) restricts the sample to municipalities with fewer than 50,000 people. Column (7) additionally controls for the property crime rate, the violent crime rate, and log population. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality by year panel. Treatment is defined at the yearly level. A media market is considered treated in a given year if Sinclair was present in the market in the January of that year.

To understand the differences-in-differences decomposition shown in columns (1) and (2), it is important to remember that Sinclair acquisitions imply a compound treatment: a change the quality of overall crime coverage, that is experienced both by covered and non-covered municipalities, and a change in quantity of local crime coverage, that is only experienced by covered municipalities. Column (1) tells us that the increase in conservative content induced by Sinclair has a direct positive effect on clearance rates. This effect could be a consequence of media market trends, but is also in line with Sinclair's conservative messaging building support for tough-on-crime policies, which might feedback into police behavior. The idea that conservative content might impact the criminal justice system has recently been explored by Ash and Poyker (2024), who find that exposure to Fox News Channel induces judges to impose harsher criminal sentences. Consistent with this explanation, we show in the previous section that that Sinclair acquisitions induce coverage of nonlocal crime to be more closely aligned with conservative narratives (Appendix Table 4). Instead, Sinclair entry does not impact the violent crime clearance rate in covered municipalities, that experience both the increase in conservative slant and a decline in the probability that local crime is covered in the news. The direct effect of Sinclair's conservative messaging is offset in covered municipalities by the decrease in their probability of appearing in the news with a local crime story. Importantly, this makes clear why we need to focus on the differential effect between the two groups of municipalities to address the main research question of the paper.

Event Study. We provide evidence supporting the parallel trends assumption by estimating an



FIGURE 4. EFFECT OF SINCLAIR ENTRY ON THE VIOLENT CRIME CLEARANCE RATE, BY YEAR SINCE TREATMENT

*Note:* This figure shows the effect of Sinclair entry on the violent crime clearance rate of covered municipalities relative to noncovered municipalities, by year since treatment. We report coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of the municipality's violent crime clearance rate on the interaction between indicator variables for years since Sinclair entry and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline, media market by year fixed effects, covered status by year fixed effects, and municipality fixed effects (equation (4)). The sample excludes always-treated media markets. The omitted category is T-1. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality by year panel. Treatment is defined at the yearly level. A media market is considered treated in a given year if Sinclair was present in the market in the January of that year. Covered municipalities are mentioned in the news more than the median municipality in 2010. Clearance rates are defined as total number of crimes cleared by arrest or exceptional means over total number of crimes, winsorized at the 99% level.

event study specification that allows the relative effect of Sinclair entry on covered and non-covered municipalities to vary by time since treatment. Figure 5 reports the  $\beta_y$  and  $\gamma_y$  coefficient estimates from equation (4), together with 95% confidence intervals.

The figure shows no difference between covered and non-covered municipalities in the four years leading up to Sinclair entry in the media market.<sup>18</sup> Consistent with the time pattern of the effect on news coverage of local crime, which showed a large effect immediately in the first year after treatment, covered municipalities have a lower violent crime clearance rate than non-covered municipalities already in the first year in which Sinclair is fully present in the media market. However, the gap between covered and non-covered municipalities becomes smaller over time.<sup>19</sup>

**Property Crime Clearance Rates.** If the police are responding to news coverage of local crime as we hypothesize, the clearance rate of crimes that are minimally in the news, such as property crimes, should not be affected by Sinclair entry. In line with this, Table 3 shows that after Sinclair enters a media market, covered and non-covered municipalities do not experience differential changes in their property crime clearance rate. The coefficients are small in magnitude

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>The paper focuses on the 2010-2017 period because it is the period for which we have collected the content data. Given that only a handful of municipalities are treated after 2015, the maximum number of pre-periods we can estimate is four. However, UCR data is easily available before 2010. As a result, we also estimate the event study specification on 2009-2017 data, which allows us to both include one additional pre-period and to estimate the other pre-period dummies using a larger sample of municipalities. Extending the pre-period sample confirms the evidence in support of the identification assumption: covered and non-covered municipalities appear to be on comparable trajectories in the five years preceding Sinclair entry (Appendix Figure 10).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>This is potentially consistent with a rational learning model in which viewers learn that the signal on local crime that they receive from Sinclair is biased, and adjusting for it based on their own observation or other media sources. To the extent that the change in content is driven by a supply-side shock that might be opaque to viewers, according to such a model it would not be surprising to see a short-run effect that tapers (DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007)).

Dependent Variable	Property Crime Clearance Rate			
Type of Crime	All	Burglary	Theft	MVT
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sinclair * Covered	$0.005 \\ (0.007)$	-0.007 (0.009)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002\\ (0.011) \end{array}$	$0.001 \\ (0.015)$
Observations Clusters Municipalities Outcome Mean in 2010	$14336 \\ 112 \\ 1792 \\ 0.191$	14336 112 1792 0.131	14329 112 1792 0.211	$     \begin{array}{r}       14279 \\       112 \\       1792 \\       0.171     \end{array} $
Municipality FE Covered By Year FE Media Market By Year FE Sinclair * Controls	X X X X	X X X X	X X X X	X X X X

TABLE 3—EFFECT OF SINCLAIR ENTRY ON THE PROPERTY CRIME CLEARANCE RATE

*Note:* This table shows the effect of Sinclair entry on the property crime clearance rate of covered municipalities relative to non-covered municipalities, overall and for different types of property crimes. We regress the municipality's clearance rate for a given type of property crime on the interaction between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline, the interaction between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and baseline municipality characteristics, media market by year fixed effects, covered status by year fixed effects, and municipality fixed effects (equation (3)). The characteristics included are log population, share male, share over 55, share black, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, share below the poverty line, and Republican vote share in the 2008 presidential election. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality by year panel. Treatment is defined at the yearly level. A media market is considered treated in a given year if Sinclair was present in the market in the January of that year. Covered municipalities are mentioned in the news more than the median municipality in 2010. Clearance rates are defined as total number of crimes cleared by arrest or exceptional means over total number of crimes, winsorized at the 99% level. MVT stands for motor vehicle theft.

and not statistically significant. The change in clearance rates is specifically related to how Sinclair influences news content, and does not depend on other factors affecting clearance rates across the board.

**Crime Rates.** A potential concern is that the change in the violent crime clearance rate might be explained by an increase in violent crimes. Looking at the effect of Sinclair entry on the violent crime rate of covered municipalities relative to non-covered municipalities suggests that this is not the case (see Appendix Table 9). Reassuringly, we do not find a statistically significant difference in the violent crime rate of covered and non-covered municipalities after Sinclair enters a media market. Even if we take the positive coefficient on the violent crime rate at face value, the magnitude of the effect (2.8%) is too small to explain the decline in the violent crime clearance rate. The same is true if we use as outcomes indicator variables equal to one if the municipality reports at least one crime of the specified type.<sup>20,21</sup>

Instead, we find that Sinclair entry is associated with 5.3% higher property crime rates in covered relative to non-covered municipalities (Appendix Table 10). The effect is significant at the 5% level. This result could be explained by a decreased incapacitation or deterrence effect due to the lower violent crime clearance rates. Alternatively, the positive effect on property crime rates might be due to a reduction in overall police effort in covered relative to non-covered municipalities, which would be consistent with a decrease in monitoring induced by lower crime news coverage. Finally, it is possible that individuals who commit property crimes are directly affected by the decline in crime content of local news (see Dahl and DellaVigna (2009) and Lindo, Swensen and Waddell (2022)). Given that the local news audience tends to be above 55, we believe that this explanation

 $<sup>^{20}</sup>$ We also note for completeness that, while we do not see an effect on the violent crime rate, the robbery crime rate and the rape incidence rate is higher in covered relative to non-covered municipalities after Sinclair entry.

 $<sup>^{21}</sup>$ This result provides additional support to the interpretation of the relative decline in news coverage of local crime in covered and non-covered municipalities after Sinclair acquires a station being driven by an editorial decision of part of Sinclair. Because crime coverage is increasing in crime rates and in violent crime rates in particular, the effect of crime rates we estimate should, if anything, bias our results on content in the opposite direction.

has a limited role in this setting.<sup>22</sup>

**Discussion.** There are three potential interpretations for the decline in the violent crime clearance rate we observe. First, police departments in covered municipalities might experience a decline in the resources that are available to them, relative to police departments in non-covered municipalities. However, we find no evidence that this is the case: after Sinclair entry, covered and non-covered municipalities have similar police expenditures and employment per capita (Appendix Table 12), although our effects are imprecisely estimated potentially because of data limitations.

Second, the police might reallocate resources from clearing violent crimes to other policingrelated activities. Two pieces of evidence seem to support this interpretation. First, to the extent that property crime rates are higher in covered versus non-covered municipalities after Sinclair entry, constant property crime clearance rates might be consistent with resources being reallocated from clearing violent to clearing property crimes. Second, arrests for low-level offenses are also differentially higher in covered municipalities relative to non-covered municipalities after Sinclair entry (Appendix Table 13). This is a suggestive result, although it needs to be interpreted with caution as we cannot disentangle whether it is driven by a change in enforcement or by a change in the occurrence of these crimes because no offense counts are available.<sup>23</sup>

Third, the police might exert less effort across the board. While we cannot reject this interpretation outright, we believe that the suggestive evidence presented above is only limitedly consistent with this view.

#### VI. Mechanisms

The explanation that we propose for our findings is that, when stories about a municipality's violent crimes are less common in the news, crime become less salient in the public opinion and the police find themselves operating in a political environment where there is less pressure to clear violent crimes. In this section, we provide three pieces of evidence supporting this explanation, but also discuss alternative mechanisms such as monitoring and community cooperation.

Salience of Crime. We test whether Sinclair entry impacts the salience of crime using two data sources: Google Trends data on searches for crime-related keywords and survey data from Gallup on whether crime is the most important problem facing the country. Neither dataset is perfect: Google searches are only available at the media market level, while even a large and nationally representative survey such as the Gallup Poll Social Series gives us few respondents for each municipality. Nevertheless, the two analyses together provide suggestive evidence of a decrease in the salience of crime in the public opinion.

We begin by looking at the Google Trends data. Because these data are not consistently available below the media market level, we implement a differences-in-differences design exploiting the staggered entry of Sinclair across media markets. The sample is restricted to media markets for which the volume of searches is available throughout the period. Table 4 shows that, when Sinclair enters a media market, the volume of searches for "crime" and "police" decreases by 4.7% and 4.2% (columns (1) and (2)). The effect is not explained by a generalized decline in search volume, as shown by placebo regressions looking at searches for "weather" and "youtube" (columns (1) and

 $<sup>^{22}</sup>$ We might be concerned that the effect on the violent crime clearance rate that we estimate is a direct consequence of this increase in the property crime rate, if to deal with the higher volume of property crimes the police have fewer resources to dedicate to clearing violent crimes. However, the change in the property crime rate is not driven by the same sub-sample as the change in the violent crime clearance rate (Appendix Table 11). In particular, we do not find a decrease in the property crime rate in non-covered municipalities or an increase in covered municipalities. We can thus rule out this alternative interpretation of our main result.

 $<sup>^{23}</sup>$ Following Premkumar (2022) and Cho, Gonçalves and Weisburst (2023), we include in low-level arrests those for curfew/loitering, disorderly conduct, drunkenness, liquor, drug possession, suspicious person, vandalism, and vagrancy. We are unfortunately unable to define clearance rates when looking at drug-related arrests because the number of low-level offenses are not provided in the UCRs, also because these types of offenses are generally unlikely to be reported separately from an arrest.

Dependent Variable	Monthly Search Volume				
	Crime	Police	Weather	Youtube	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Sinclair	$-0.047^{***}$ (0.015)	$-0.042^{***}$ (0.014)	-0.000 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.011)	
Observations	14976	14976	14976	14976	
Outcome Mean in 2010	3.627	3.920	3.873	4.285	
Media Market FE	Х	Х	Х	Х	
Month FE	X	Х	Х	X	
Media Market Controls	Х	X	X	X	

TABLE 4—EFFECT OF SINCLAIR ENTRY ON THE SALIENCE OF CRIME, GOOGLE TRENDS

*Note:* This table shows the effect of Sinclair entry on the salience of crime and police using Google Trends data and a differencesin-differences design. We regress the search volume for "crime" (column (1)), "police" (column (2)), "weather" (column (3)) and "youtube" (column (4)) on an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market, baseline media market characteristics interacted with month fixed effects, media market fixed effects, and month fixed effects. The characteristics included are log population, share male, share male between 15 and 30, share white, share Hispanic, share unemployed, and log income per capita. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a media market by month panel. Treatment is defined at the monthly level. The monthly level of searches is in logs.

(2)). The decrease in local crime stories triggers a change in public interest for precisely those topics that are now less present on local news.<sup>24</sup>

We then turn to the Gallup Poll Social Series, a set of public opinion surveys that include a question about the most important problem facing the country, with crime being one of the possible answers. Table 5 shows that, after Sinclair enters a media market, covered municipalities are less likely to have at least one respondent that reports crime as being the most important problem relative to non-covered municipalities.<sup>25</sup> Controlling for the number of respondents interviewed in each municipality and year (column (2)) or estimating the regression on a quasi-balanced sample of municipalities (column (3)) does not impact the result. This is again consistent with Sinclair entry having a negative effect on crime salience. To put the magnitude of this effect into perspective, we compute persuasion rates using survey data on local TV news consumption and imposing assumptions on TV viewers' channel switching behavior. We find persuasion rates spanning the 6%-39% range using survey data and around 78% using ratings data. The survey-based persuasion rates are relatively large but still in line with those found in the literature, while we consider the one computed used using ratings data as a helpful upper bound (see Appendix E for more details).

**Political Feedback.** If the change in news coverage of local crime makes crime less salient in the public opinion, we expect politicians and the police chiefs they appoint to react to it.<sup>26,27</sup>

 $^{24}$ Two additional points to explain this result. First, we view Google searches as proxy for a topic's salience, which in turn is strongly impacted by news coverage of the topic. Hence, the result of Table 4 is consistent with the estimates of Table 1. Second, media market-level Google searches practically give an average of the municipality-level searches weighted by population. Since covered municipalities tend to be bigger, it is plausible that this weighted average would be negative.

 $<sup>^{25}</sup>$ The large magnitude of the effect relative to the baseline mean in 2010 is explained by the fact that the share of individuals who believe that crime is the most important problem increases sharply over the time period we study. For example, the outcome mean is almost 0.05 in 2017 (0.07 for covered municipalities).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>Police department chiefs are generally appointed (and removed at will) by the head of local government, which implies that their incentives tend to be aligned with those of the municipality's administration (Owens (2020)). Consistent with this, research has shown that political incentives affect law enforcement (Makowsky and Stratmann (2009), Makowsky, Stratmann and Tabarrok (2019), Goldstein, Sances and You (2020)). In addition, managerial directives can have important effects on police behavior (Ba and Rivera (Forthcoming), Mummolo (2018)), supporting the idea that pressure coming from the top might influence the effort allocation of police officers.

 $<sup>^{27}</sup>$ The following quote, included in a case study on how politics influence police in an American city by Davies (2007), highlights the mechanism we have in mind: "The following case study results show [...] substantial impact of the city council on homicide investigations and, ultimately, on case clearances. [...] The media was seen as the catalyst for formal actions by other components of the authorizing environment to improve the murder clearance rate. The media shaped public opinion about the quality of public safety."

	Most Important Problem is Crime			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
Sinclair * Covered	$-0.034^{**}$ (0.017)	$-0.032^{*}$ (0.016)	$-0.037^{*}$ (0.022)	
Observations	9430	9430	8009	
Clusters	112	112	110	
Municipalities	1619	1619	1194	
Outcome Mean in 2010	0.014	0.014	0.016	
Municipality FE	Х	Х	Х	
Covered By Year FE	Х	Х	Х	
Media Market By Year FE	Х	Х	Х	
Sinclair * Controls	Х	Х	Х	
Controls for Number of Respondents		Х		
Semi-balanced Sample			Х	

TABLE 5-EFFECT OF SINCLAIR ENTRY ON THE SALIENCE OF CRIME, GALLUP

*Note:* This table shows the effect of Sinclair entry on whether individuals report crime as the most important problem the country is facing in covered municipalities relative to non-covered municipalities. We regress an indicator variable equal to one if at least one respondent in the municipality reported crime as the most important problem on the interaction between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline, the interaction between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline, the interaction between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and baseline municipality characteristics, media market by year fixed effects, covered status by year fixed effects, and municipality fixed effects (equation (3)). The characteristics included are log population, share male, share over 55, share black, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, share below the poverty line, and Republican vote share in the 2008 presidential election. Column (2) controls for the number of respondents. Column (3) restricts the sample to municipality by year panel. Treatment is defined at the yearly level. A media market is considered treated in a given year if Sinclair was present in the market in the January of that year.

This political feedback mechanism is particularly credible in this setting, given that the individuals whose opinion is likely to be influenced by local news are exactly the ones who are more active in local politics: those over 55. We provide descriptive evidence supporting this statement using the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (Ansolabehere (2012)). Individuals over 55 are 25% more likely to watch local TV news and 50% more likely to attend local political meetings compared to younger individuals (Appendix Figure 11). They also exhibit higher turnout rates in local elections (Einstein et al. (2023)). In addition, Goldstein (2021) shows that people over 55 are an especially important interest group for local politics when it comes to crime and policing.

Consistent with this argument, we find that the effect on the violent crime clearance rate is driven by municipalities with a larger share of the population above 55 (*p*-value of a test of equality of the effect of Sinclair in the two groups of municipalities = 0.158), even though the change in content is exactly the same across the two groups of municipalities (Appendix Table 14). While the difference in the effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels, this evidence supports the idea of a change in public opinion operating through a political feedback mechanism as a possible explanation for the findings of the paper.

Media Monitoring. An alternative explanation is that there could be a decrease in media monitoring of the police. To explore whether this is the case, we use our content data to separately identify stories about crime incidents and about arrests.<sup>28</sup> The decline in crime reporting is almost entirely driven by stories about crime incidents, whereas stories about arrests experience a much smaller decline, which is also not statistically significant (see Appendix Table 15). These results do not support direct media monitoring through stories about police clearances as the main explanation for the results, although we cannot exclude the possibility that police officers are updating their overall probability of being the subject of reporting based on the decline in crime coverage.

**Community Cooperation.** It is also possible for the effect on clearance rates to be driven by

 $<sup>^{28}</sup>$ We define stories to be about arrests if they contain one of the following arrest-related keywords: arrest, capture, detention, custody, apprehend, catch, caught, detain, imprison, incarcerat, jail. All other stories are about crime.

decreased community cooperation with the police. Community cooperation is generally considered important for successful policing and crime investigations, and it has been shown to decrease after high-profile cases of police violence that negatively impact perceptions of the police (Ang et al. (2023)). It is unclear why the change in content that we document should have negative effects on police perceptions: people are seeing fewer stories about crimes and a similar number of stories about arrests, so they should perceive the police as being equally, if not more, effective.

Having said this, we might still worry that, independently of what the public thinks of the police, people might be less likely to spontaneously provide useful information to solve crimes if they do not hear about the crime incidents on TV. Unfortunately, there exist almost no data on the importance of tips for solving crimes, which limits our ability of testing this mechanism directly. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the effect on the violent crime clearance rate is too large for tips to be the main driver of the effect we estimate. Were the decrease in clearance rates caused by a drop in tips, it should be concentrated in those violent crimes that are no longer covered in the news after Sinclair enters a media market. However, because not all crimes are covered in the news, Sinclair controls one of four stations in the media market, and the other stations are not adjusting their crime coverage, the change in content that we document implies too few incidents no longer appearing in the news for the magnitude of the effect on clearance rates to be credible. Instead, the magnitude of the effect can be more easily reconciled by abandoning the one-to-one correspondence between crimes reported in the news and crimes cleared by the police. That is, by thinking that the effect comes from the clearance rates of all violent crimes (i.e., not just the ones covered in the news) changing by 7.2%, as would be the case under the mechanism that we propose earlier in this section.

# VII. Conclusion

In this paper, we ask whether municipal police departments in the United States respond to news coverage of local crime. To get exogenous variation in content, we exploit acquisitions of local TV stations by the Sinclair Broadcast Group. We find that ownership matters for content: once acquired by Sinclair, TV stations decrease news coverage of local crime. The police respond to this change in media content: municipalities that experience a decline in news coverage of local crime have lower violent crime clearance rates relative to municipalities that do not.

The fact that ownership matters for content and that this has an effect on the police has far reaching implications for media plurality and, importantly, for its regulation. The deepening of the crisis of the traditional business model of local media has resulted in a trend of increasing ownership concentration, that in fact characterizes not only local TV (Stahl (2016)) but also other media types such as newspapers (Hendrickson (2019)). Our results show that the resulting news nationalization might impact not only voters as has been widely documented (Hayes and Lawless (2015), Darr, Hitt and Dunaway (2018), Moskowitz (2021)), but also public officials such as police officers, thus having tangible externalities for local governments across the board.

This urges a rethinking of media regulations. First, it is important to consider the notion of market that regulators adopt. Many of the restrictions that the FCC imposes on ownership concentration are media market specific, whereas we show that ownership concentration of outlets across markets is also highly relevant. Second, our results show that the trend of increasing concentration has consequence that go beyond the media industry. As suggested by Prat (2018), Rolnik et al. (2019), media mergers should probably not only be evaluated with a focus on consumer welfare, but also taking into account these downstream consequences.

Answering these questions requires a collective effort within the scholarly community. Even within the setting of this study, a few aspects remain unexplored. Is the effect we document Sinclair-specific, or a more general consequence of the business model of large broadcast groups? Is the accountability of local public officials beyond police officers also affected? We hope to explore this question in future research.

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